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A. Introduction
With increasing frequency, parties involved in litigation in American
courts have invoked foreign legislation in an effort to excuse, limit or condi-
tion compliance with routine pretrial disclosure obligations under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous provisions of state law. The
recent proliferation of so-called blocking legislation has confronted litigants
seeking disclosure from a foreign party-or from a domestic party whose
documents, information or witnesses are located in another nation-with a
unique set of practical problems which bear significantly on the ability
effectively to prosecute the litigation. Conversely, of course, the blocking
statutes provide parties whose nations have enacted them with new and
potentially significant opportunities to impede or even foreclose discovery.
This article examines foreign concealment legislation from the standpoint
of the litigant for whom it is essential to pursue the most effective and effi-
cient means of obtaining disclosure from a party invoking foreign law.
After describing the procedural context in which the discovery dispute will
most frequently arise, the article explores in detail several of the more
prominent foreign blocking statutes, including their legislative history, and
then discusses the prevailing U.S. case law treatment of the predominant
issues.
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B. The Procedural Context
The procedural context in which most issues relating to foreign blocking
legislation will arise is of classic simplicity: shortly after the commence-
ment of the litigation, a party serves on its adversary any one of the disclo-
sure demands which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related state
statutes authorize. The most typical disclosure devices utilized at the earlier
stages of litigation include interrogatories, requests for production of docu-
ments and notices of deposition. The adverse party, if it is a foreign
national whose country has enacted blocking legislation, typically then
responds to the discovery requests with a document stating essentially that
no disclosure will be provided because compliance with the discovery
requests might lead to the imposition of criminal sanctions under foreign
law. I
When served with this type of responsive document, the American litiga-
tor is confronted essentially with a choice among three alternatives:
1. the utilization of a motion to compel, pursuant to Rule 37 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure or analogous state rule, as a vehicle for
mounting a frontal attack on the scope and effectiveness of the partic-
ular blocking legislation invoked and the particular party's right to
invoke it;
2. the assessment of the foreign party's relationship with related U.S.
entities, such as subsidiaries, which might have access to the same
information sought from the party claiming immunity under the
blocking legislation; or
3. particularly in the case of a multidefendant lawsuit, the avoidance of
the costly, time-consuming and perhaps futile quest for information
from the nondisclosing party by looking to other similarly situated
adverse parties to secure the evidence needed to implicate the nondis-
closing party as well as the parties who are making disclosure.
The use of any one of these alternatives obviously does not preclude con-
sideration of any of the others. Typically, however, a litigant's crucial strat-
egy in the pretrial phase of any action is to exert on the defendants as much
pressure, in terms of document demands, interrogatories and deposition
discovery, as possible. An adverse party which has elected to invoke a for-
eign blocking statute has attempted, by the use of a single device, to circum-
'Among the most frequently cited foreign blocking statutes are those enacted by Canada,
Uranium Information Security Regulations, Stat. 0. & R., 76-644 (P.C. 1976-2368, Sept. 21,
1976), promulgated under authority of Atomic Energy Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. (1970)
c.A-19; Australia, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, Austl.
Acts. No. 121; England, Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c.187; France, Law No.
80-538, dated July 16, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise (July 17, 1980); and
South Africa, Atomic Energy Act, § 30A(1)(a), 1978. The use of the nomenclature "blocking
statute" to describe foreign laws which purport to qualify, interdict or control disclosure in
United States litigation has obtained wide acceptance in recent years and is routinely utilized
in the relevant cases. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Point-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1326, fn. 145 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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vent the burdens of providing discovery at the outset of the lawsuit, relying
on the specter of potentially complicated foreign law questions to chill the
enthusiasm of a plaintiff or counterclaimant to pursue pretrial disclosure.
For strategic reasons, then, a party confronted with the invocation of a for-
eign "blocking" statute should not turn away from the peremptory chal-
lenge presented by the initial nondisclosing response. Beyond the strategic
reasons for engaging directly a foreign concealment response is, of course,
the elemental fact that the need for disclosure is essential for the proof of a
plaintiff's claim. 2
As a general matter, American courts, confronted with a party relying on
blocking legislation, have turned aside claims to exemption from disclosure
and compelled production of documents and answers to interrogatories. To
this extent, the decision to mount a frontal attack on the particular foreign
blocking statute at issue has firm ground in terms of the likelihood of a
favorable result, albeit the cost of reaching that result can be extremely
high.
Notwithstanding the general tendency of recent decisions of U.S. courts
to overrule claims of exemption based on foreign law, additional difficulties
have developed when the party which has secured the order compelling
disclosure is faced with continued noncompliance and then seeks to enforce
that order against its foreign adversary. In general, the case law discloses
an unwillingness on the part of the courts to impose effective sanctions to
enforce orders of disclosure. There is thus a discontinuity between the gen-
eral position of U.S. courts that foreign blocking legislation will not excuse
disclosure and the extent to which the courts are prepared to fashion genu-
inely effective sanctions orders.
C. The More Significant Foreign Blocking Statutes
Two principal types of blocking legislation have emerged in recent
years: those which, like recently enacted French legislation, attempt to con-
dition discovery on the American party's compliance with foreign proce-
2This article treats exclusively the situation in which discovery demands are served upon a
foreign party with respect to whom no substantial issue of jurisdiction exists. As applied to
parties to the litigation, pretrial disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure extends
to any nonprivileged information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Provision is made under FED. R. Civ. P. 33 for the use of
interrogatories addressed to parties, while document production by parties to the suit is con-
trolled by FED. R. Civ. P. 34. In F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson,
supra, 636 F.2d 1300, 1309, fn. 37 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia said: "An American court has the power to compel a person over whom it has
personaljurisdiction. . . to produce documents outside the court's jurisdiction. ... [Empha-
sis in original.] In the event a party interposes an objection to disclosure in response to discov-
ery requests under FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 33 or 34, the requesting party is entitled to move for an
order to compel responses pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The rules applicable to discovery
requests directed at nonparty witnesses appear in FED. R. Civ. P. 45 and 37, as well as at 28
U.S.C. § 1783 (1976). This article does not address the unique issues relating to compliance
with subpoenas addressed to nonparty witnesses who are citizens or residents of foreign
nations.
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dural law and international treaties, and those which purport to interdict
disclosure entirely in connection with certain subject matters. The first type
of concealment legislation, which, in the French version, extends to all com-
mercial litigation, is the more recent and the more sophisticated of the two
forms. For that reason, the terms of that type of legislation, particularly the
French statutory scheme, are explored in greater detail below than the other
type of foreign blocking statutes, which were enacted by several nations,
including Australia and Canada, in the middle of the last decade to prohibit
completely disclosure of information relating primarily to uranium and
uranium production.
1. The French Legislation.- Obstruction of Pretrial Disclosure by Reference
to French Procedural Rules and International Treaties
(A) THE LANGUAGE OF THE LEGISLATION
Enacted on July 16, 1980, and entitled "Law concerning the communica-
tion of documents or information of an economic, commercial, industrial,
financial or technical nature to aliens, whether natural or artificial persons,"
the French blocking statute contains four sections. The first section
declares it unlawful, with certain qualifications, for a French national to
disclose to a foreign entity any information which might impair France's
sovereignty, security, or its "basic economic interests." Fully translated, the
operative provision of Article 1 of the statute is as follows:
Without prejudice to international treaties or agreements, a natural person of
French nationality or customarily residing on French territory, or director, repre-
sentative, agent or official of an artificial person with headquarters or an estab-
lishment on French territory, shall not communicate in writing, orally, or in any
other form, regardless of place, to the public authorities of another country, docu-
ments or information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or techni-
cal nature where such communication is liable to threaten France's sovereignty,
security or basic economic interests or the public order, as defined by the
administering authority when necessary. 3
The second principal section of the statute, Article la, declares it unlaw-
ful for anyone, including an American litigant, to seek disclosure from
French sources other than through means prescribed by French law:
Without prejudice to international treaties or agreements and to current laws
and regulations, a person shall not ask for, -seek or communicate in writing,
orally, or in any other form, documents or information of an economic, commer-
cial, industrial, financial or technical nature that may constitute proof with a view
to legal or administrative proceedings in another country or in the framework of
such proceedings.
Article 2 requires any person within the scope of Articles 1 and l a to
notify the "competent" French minister of any request for information,
3This translation of the French statute was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson,
supra, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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including the service on a French party involved in U.S. litigation of inter-
rogatories, document demands or deposition notices. Finally, Article 3 pur-
ports to impose criminal sanctions which would apply to a violation of the
legislation:
Without prejudice to more serious penalties provided by law, any violations of
articles 1 and la of this law shall be punishable by two to six months' imprison-
ment and a fine of from 10,000 to 120,000 francs [$2,500 to $30,000] or either one
of these two penalties alone.
(B) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the blocking statute discloses that the law was
clearly designed as an effort to preclude pretrial discovery of French nation-
als involved as parties in American litigation. Report No. 1814 of the
French National Assembly dated June 19, 1980 (the Report), which
explains the background, purpose and intended impact of the blocking stat-
ute, is premised on the French perception of the "abuse" inherent in all
pretrial discovery in American courts. The Report is candid in its articula-
tion of the purpose of the blocking statute to immunize French corporations
from the need to comply with discovery obligations in American courts.
Indeed, the Report contains such a remarkable glimpse of French legisla-
tive antipathy toward U.S. pretrial disclosure that any American party
seeking an order to compel should consider attaching the Report to the
motion papers, in order to provide the judge with a comprehensive display
of the extent to which the legislation is designed to thwart disclosure in
American litigation.4
Briefly described, the Report reveals the fundamental antagonism of the
French legislature to pretrial disclosure as conducted under U.S. law:
The American system for determining evidence is greatly different from ours. In
the United States, in fact, these procedures are essentially left to the care of the
parties and rather readily lend themselves to abuse, as these investigations gener-
ally do not require authorization or judicial control.5
In explaining the genesis of the blocking statute, the Report condemns
the practice of American attorneys who "collect depositions, evidence and
documents ultimately intended to serve the interests of their clients ....
Our law does not clearly focus on these practices contrary to our public
order and prejudicial to French nationals.6 Clearly identifying what the
French perceived as the irreconcilable difference between routine American
"No translation of the Report into English is generally available. The Report is officially
entitled Rapport Fail au Nom de la Commission de la Production et des Echanges (1) sur le
Projet do Loi Adopte par le Senat relatif a la Communication de Documents et Renseignments
d'ordre Economique, Commercial ou Technique a des Personnes Pshysiques ou Morales
Etrangeres. The author will make available to any interested person a copy of a translation of
the Report, which exceeds 60 pages in length, prepared by the Translation Company of
America, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York.
'Report at 10. (References to page numbers in the Report are to the French original.)
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pretrial discovery devices and French procedures, the Report in addition
states:
[T]he so-called pretrial phase of suits in countries with "common law"... per-
mits one party to conduct an initial investigation for evidence of a possible infrac-
tion which will be prejudicial to him. As the accusatory procedure is contrary to
even the spirit of our procedural law, it is not possible to assimilate this phase to
an element of [French] judicial procedure. 7
Further describing American "pretrial discovery" as "a sort of prejudicial
phase," the Report asserts categorically that France does "not recognize the
pretrial procedure in force in the United States." 8 In this context, the cen-
tral purpose of the blocking legislation was described as "the protection of
French companies against abusive investigations by foreign authorities."
And, as justification for enactment of the blocking statute, the Report con-
tended that "many examples demonstrate that French companies are not
protected from manifestly discriminatory practices which do not respect
business secrecy." 9
Given these views, the vehicle selected by the French legislature to pro-
vide "protection" to French corporations was the 1980 blocking statute.
The Report states:
Because of the weak protection of business secrecy in the United States, these
actions (relating to pretrial disclosure] made it possible to disclose information
relating to business and also to manufacturing procedures. According to all the
evidence, it is therefore desirable to expand the protective provisions of [French
legislation] to all economic sectors.10
Consequently, as described by the Report, the blocking statute
[W]ill offer our nationals a juridicial weapon which will at least make it possi-
ble for them to gain time. The conflict thus created will block matters for a time
and will make it possible to raise the conflict to an intergovernmental level.Il
Viewed in its totality, the legislative history of the blocking statute dem-
onstrates that its impetus was a perception of the impropriety which the
French legislature regarded as inherent in all American pretrial disclosure.
In terms of its purported impact, the French legislation seeks to eliminate
pretrial discovery by relieving French corporations of any obligation to pro-
vide discovery in American courts in accordance with procedures and prac-
tices such as those contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As
the legislative history candidly concedes, the purpose of the statute is "to
block matters" as far as providing pretrial disclosure in American litigation
is concerned.
Significantly, in the context of a motion to compel disclosure from a
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frankly negates any threat that the criminal sanctions provision of the law is
intended to operate against French nationals. The Report reveals that the
provisions on sanctions were included primarily to enable a French party to
create the illusion of potential exposure to punishment. After setting forth
the text of the sanctions provisions (which purport to provide for imprison-
ment and fines for violation of the statute), the Report makes it clear that
they were included solely to produce an in terrorem effect when invoked in
the context of American litigation:
[I]t is necessary not to misunderstand the actual scope of these penalties, which
does not clearly appear on the simple reading of the statute . . . . These penal-
ties are applied only on the improbable assumption that the companies would
refuse to make use of the protective provisions offered to them. In all other cases,
these potential fines will assure foreign judges of the judicial basis for the legal
excuse which the companies will not fail to make use of. [Emphasis supplied.]' 2
As disclosed by this legislative record, the sanctions provisions were
apparently intended to have a prophylactic effect based on the French legis-
lature's belief that the specter of criminal liability will stay the hand of an
American court in ordering disclosure from a French national.
(C) THE FRENCH RESERVATION UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
RELATING TO PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
Both the United States and France are signatories to the "Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters" (hereinaf-
ter the Hague Convention).13 The Hague Convention contains certain pro-
cedures, such as letters of request and commissions, which can be utilized in
certain cases for the purpose of taking evidence abroad.
A sophisticated and superficially appealing linkage exists between the
Hague Convention and the blocking statute. Read literally, the blocking
statute appears to require nothing more than an American litigant's use of
the Hague Convention techniques in order to obtain evidence from a
French national. Again at an ostensible level, the blocking statute criminal-
izes disclosure only to the extent such disclosure occurs in a context other
than that of the Hague Convention. A French party which refuses to
answer traditional American interrogatories or document demands thus is
in a position to assert to a U.S. court that satisfactory disclosure can be
obtained from it if the American litigant merely complies with the Hague
Convention's mechanisms, thus foregoing use of traditional discovery
devices such as interrogatories and document demands.
Notwithstanding the surface appeal of this position, it merits emphasis
that the blocking statute, in seeking to preclude pretrial disclosure, is
"Id at 48. [Emphasis supplied].
"The text of the (Hague) Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, done March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (1972) appears in 7
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 4509 (1980), together with a listing of signatory nations
and their reservations.
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designed to work in conjunction with the French version of the Hague Con-
vention, which expressly prohibits the use of the letters of request procedure
to obtain pretrial disclosure. Article 23 of the Hague Convention, a provi-
sion which enables an adopting nation to exempt cooperation on pretrial
discovery matters from the terms of the treaty, provides as follows:
A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession,
declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law Countries.
When it became a signatory to the treaty in 1974, France elected to make
an Article 23 reservation to the Hague Convention:
[I]n application of Article 23, it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the
purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
Countries.
The consequence of the application of the Article 23 reservation made by
France is readily apparent. Since virtually all discovery in American litiga-
tion is "pretrial," the Hague Convention offers no meaningful assistance to
American litigants seeking pretrial disclosure from French individuals or
corporations. 14
As the legislative history demonstrates, the Article 23 reservation and the
blocking statute were designed to function in unison for the ultimate pur-
pose of erecting barriers to obtaining meaningful pretrial discovery, in any
form, from French nationals. The Report accompanying the enactment of
the blocking statute demonstrates that a basic reason for its adoption was to
ensure the more complete effectiveness of the Article 23 prohibition on the
use of the Hague Convention in France for purposes of pretrial disclosure.
As the Report states:
The Convention has therefore been found to be insufficient to avoid excessive
orders for the communication of documents abroad as well as demands for evi-
dence collected under abusive conditions without application of the elementary
rights of justice. 15
In a revealing conclusion, the Report explains that the blocking legislation
"has the purpose of filling in the gaps" which the French perceived to have
existed under the Hague Convention. The Report underscored that the
Article 23 reservation adopted by France "was directed at excluding pretrial
proceedings"'16 from the scope of France's participation in the Convention.
'Indicative of the negative effect of France's reservation relating to pre-trial disclosure is the
report of two commentators on the French experience under the Hague Convention that, by
the middle of 1978, the treaty had been used to obtain evidence in France in only one (1)
commercial matter. J. Borel & S. Boyd, Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence
in Francefor Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAw. 35, 45 (1979). A further
impediment to the effective use of the Hague Convention derives from the provision of Article
12 that a signatory nation can refuse to execute a letter of request if the letter would infringe
the "sovereignty or security" of the executing state. 23 U.S.T. at 2568.
"Report at 21.
"Id at 17. [Emphasis supplied.]
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In summary, an American litigator seeking to compel answers from a
nondisclosing French party is in a position to place before the court a
French legislative history which lays bare the fact that the enactment of the
blocking statute, coupled with France's Article 23 reservation, is calculated
to foreclose pretrial disclosure from French corporations by French legisla-
tive fiat. Viewed against this background, a French defendant's assertion
that the U.S. party should be required to resort to the procedures of the
Hague Convention and French law is, arguably, an invitation to engage in
a futile quest for pretrial disclosure. The legislation, in effect, constitutes a
clear challenge to the operation of pretrial disclosure devices in U.S. courts
as applied to parties who are French nationals. Equipped not only with the
language of the 1980 statute but with its legislative history as well, an
American litigator can frame for the court, in sharp terms, the conflict
between American disclosure rules and the French legislation. As a general
matter, it will be to the advantage of the party seeking disclosure to provide
the court with the underlying legislative history and French statutory
scheme.
2. The British Trading Interests Act
Enactment of the French blocking legislation followed by only a few
months the adoption of British legislation designed to "provide protection
from requirements, prohibitions, and judgments imposed or given under
the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trading
or other interests of persons in the United Kingdom."' 7 The British legisla-
tion's explicit scope is significantly broader than that of the French legisla-
tion,' 8 but the statute also contains a discovery-related provision whose
consequences can clearly include the circumvention of U.S. pretrial disclo-
sure devices by British nationals or others seeking exemption under British
law. Like the French statute, the British law does not purport to involve a
complete interdiction of discovery, but is similarly available for broad use
as a means of circumventing disclosure.
The discovery provision of the British Trading Interest Act' 9 grants to
the British Secretary of State the ability to prohibit persons or corporations
in the United Kingdom from furnishing commercial information or pro-
ducing commercial documents for use in a foreign country. Broad discre-
tionary authority is accorded to the Secretary of State to provide a British
entity with immunity from disclosure. The power to preclude compliance
with U.S. discovery orders or requests is so expansive that the Secretary of
"Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 187 (hereinafter "Trading Interests Act"). See
Rosen, Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 INT'L LAW. 213 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Rosen].
"Rosen at 213. The "clawback" provisions of the statute, for example, would enable a Brit-
ish corporation cast in liability by an American court to recover from its adversary all elements
of the damage award other than those for compensatory damages. The "clawback" provision
has particular significance in the area of antitrust judgments and treble damage awards.
"Trading Interests Act § 2(1).
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State can overrule compliance with any pretrial discovery device precisely
and solely on the ground that it is a "pretrial disclosure" device.
20
As is the case with the French legislation, the American litigator seeking
disclosure can place before the U.S. court the expansiveness of the British
legislation's attempt to preclude compliance with U.S. discovery devices
directed against British parties to American litigation. The demonstration
of the actual impetus for the blocking statute of a particular nation may
have significance in influencing a U.S. judge's decision on whether to com-
pel disclosure. Perhaps because both the French and British statutes are so
recent, no reported decision in the United States apparently has yet
resolved a motion to compel discovery from a party which has invoked
either statute as an excuse for nondisclosure. However, U.S. decisions have
addressed blocking statutes of the second general type-most of which have
been in existence since the middle of the last decade-and decisions with
respect to those earlier, more narrowly drawn statutes may foreshadow the
disposition of motions involving the French and British law.
3. Concealment by Complete Interdiction.-
Canada, Australia and South Africa
(A) THE CANADIAN REGULATIONS
Enacted on September 21, 1976, the Canadian government's "Uranium
Information Security Regulations" are representative of several of the for-
eign blocking statutes which were targeted on the complete interdiction of
disclosure relating to uranium production. Extensive litigation was gener-
ated by the Canadian and similar regulations, and the resolution of those
disputes forms the framework in which the later, more sweeping and more
sophisticated statutes of the French and British type will be litigated.
The Canadian regulations were enacted after a federal grand jury in the
United States had commenced an investigation of a cartel which had alleg-
edly been formed among domestic and foreign suppliers and producers of
uranium to fix prices, allocate markets and boycott certain customers in the
United States. In broad and stark language, the Canadian regulations pur-
ported to forbid any person to release documents "related to conversations,
discussions or meetings that took place between January 1, 1972 and
December 31, 1975 involving that person or any other person in relation to
the exporting from Canada or marketing for use outside Canada of ura-
nium or its derivatives ...."21
At the time of the adoption of the prohibitory regulations, the Canadian
Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources, Alastair Gillespie, stated frankly
that:
1.Id § 5(l)(2). Moreover, Britain, in adopting the Hague Convention, also implemented the
reservation under Article 23 which excludes from the scope of the treaty letters of request
involving pre-trial discovery of documents.
2
"S.O.R./76-644, Canada Gazette Pt. II, Vol. 110, No. 19, Oct. 13, 1976.
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The action was taken in the light of the sweeping demand for such information
[relating to uranium marketing activities during 1972-75] by U.S. subpoenas,
which, while served upon officers of U.S. companies, call for the presentation of
information in the possession of subsidiary or affiliate companies "wherever
located."'2
2
Another Canadian official, J.S. Stanford of the Canadian Department of
External Affairs, acknowledged that his government sought, by enactment
of the legislation, "to accord what protection it can to private firms prose-
cuted abroad" as a result of participation in uranium production and allo-
cation of activities.
23
(B) THE AUSTRALIAN STATUTE
The Australian government enacted a similar statute in November 1976
which contains, like the Canadian regulation, a sweeping prohibition on
disclosure of activities related to uranium production. Explaining the pur-
pose of the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act,
1976, Australia's Attorney-General advised the House of Representatives:
The immediate need for this Bill has arisen out of certain legal proceedings
that are being taken in the United States of America under the antitrust legisla-
tion of that country. The operation of the Bill, however, is not'confined to mat-
ters arising out of those proceedings. The U.S. proceedings relate to
arrangements alleged to have been made for the marketing of uranium in 1972.
I shall indicate briefly the nature of the proceedings that have been instituted in
the United States. First, there is a grand jury inquiry to establish a case for crimi-
nal prosecution of the parties alleged to have been involved in the marketing
arrangements. Secondly, civil proceedings claiming treble damages-which
could be of the order of $7 billion-have been instituted by Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corporation against 29 United States and foreign uranium producers, includ-
ing four Australian companies. Thirdly, proceedings have been instituted against
the Westinghouse Corporation by sixteen United States utilities in respect of the
nonsupply of uranium under contracts entered into with Westinghouse, and
Westinghouse is resisting those claims on grounds that involve allegations of con-
traventions of the anti-trust laws by the uranium producers. Finally, and perhaps
for present purposes most urgently, letters of request have been issued to the
Supreme Court of New South Wales in connection with the last mentioned pro-
ceedings. These letters of request seek the taking of evidence from persons in this
country and relating to documents located here.
In connection with the present dispute concerning uranium, Canada has
recently made a regulation indicating that it rejects the jurisdiction being asserted
by the U.S. authorities as an unjustified invasion of its sovereignty. This is sub-
stantially the purpose of the Bill that I am now presenting.
24
2Id
'Stanford, The Application ofthe Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States. A View
from Abroad, I 1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 206 (1968).
24102H Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Thirtieth Parliament, 1st Sess., 2d
Period, 2909-10 (1976).
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Under the Act, the Australian Attorney-General issued at least one order
which sought to throw a blanket of secrecy over all documents pertaining to
conversations, discussions or meetings concerning the uranium industry, all
conduct resulting from such communications, and all contracts, agreements
or arrangements resulting from such communications. 25
(C) THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION
In 1978, South Africa, also seeking to expand its secrecy legislation,
added a new Section 30A to the Atomic Energy Act, barring disclosure of
any information "which is in any manner whatsoever connected with con-
versations, discussions, meetings or negotiations of any nature whatsoever,
which took place between 1 January 1972 and 31 December 1975, between
producers of source material or any derivatives or compounds thereof,
whether in or outside the Republic, in connection with the production,
importation, exportation, refinement, possession, ownership, use or sale
thereof .... -26
The Canadian, Australian and South African statutes have been at issue
in U.S. litigation. Each of the statutes represented the respective govern-
ment's attempt to provide a barrier against the extraterritorial application
of U.S. procedural and substantive law. The judicial response in the
United States to these and related foreign efforts provides critical guidance
to the American litigant confronted with similar claims by an adversary
seeking protection under the same laws or the more sophisticated variety
recently adopted by France and Britain.
D. The U.S. Judicial Response to the Invocation of Foreign
Concealment or Blocking Legislation
If the litigation decision has been reached to mount a frontal attack on an
adversary's invocation of any form of foreign blocking or concealment stat-
ute, the papers submitted in support of the motion should, at a minimum;
1. demonstrate the relevancy to the litigation of the information sought;
2. set forth the particular statute involved and its legislative history; and
3. describe the relevant judicial precedents which have led to orders of dis-
closure by other courts confronted with similar claims.27
"Order of the Attorney-General, AustI., Govt. Gazette, No.S.239 (Dec. 24, 1976).
26Atomic Energy Act, § 30A(l)(a).
17Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a two-step approach to
motions to compel discovery. The first step involves the obtaining of the disclosure order
itself. The second step develops in the context in which the nondisclosing party persists in
failing to provide discovery and the party which has obtained the order seeks to obtain sanc-
tions. See, e.g., Halverson v. Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Mensik, 381 F. Supp. 672, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ("The sanctions set out in Rule 37
come into operation only upon the refusal of a party to obey an order of the court under Rule
37(a)"); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 F.R.D. 96, 108 (N.D. Ill.
1966). The unique problems associated with the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply
with discovery orders when foreign concealment statutes are involved are discussed later in
this article.
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1. The Predominance of American Disclosure Devices in the
Contest with Foreign Blocking Statutes
At issue in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation28 were the statutes of
Canada, South Africa and Australia which purported to block all informa-
tion relating to uranium and uranium production activities in those nations.
As described by the court in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the foreign
blocking statutes at issue "generally prohibit the production of any docu-
ment relating to uranium marketing activities from 1972 through 1975 and
also prohibit communications that would result in the disclosure of the con-
tents of such documents."' 29 Like the French blocking legislation, the for-
eign statutes at issue in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation purported to
"impose criminal penalties for their violation, including fines and
imprisonment." 30
In rejecting the claims of exemption from disclosure, the court in the Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation established a frequently cited approach to the dis-
position of foreign exemption claims by a nondisclosing party:
Once personal jurisdiction over the person and control over the documents by the
person are present, a U.S. court has the power to order production of the docu-
ments. The existence of a conflicting foreign law which prohibits the disclosure of
the requested documents does not prevent the exercise of this po wer. 31
In reaching its determination to order production, the court in the Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation rejected defense arguments that American courts
.'should balance the vital national interests of the United States and the
foreign countries to determine which interests predominate. '32 As the leg-
islative history of the French blocking legislation demonstrates, the interest
which the French sought to advance was to exempt French business from
what were perceived as the abuses which routine American pretrial discov-
ery devices entail. Likewise, the blocking legislation at issue in In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation sought to conceal documents of foreign firms from
disclosure in order to protect interests which the foreign nations involved
regarded as important. The court in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation
28480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11. 1979).
'"480 F. Supp. at 1143.
"Old
31480 F. Supp. at 1145. [Emphasis supplied.] The court in In re Uranium Aniltrust Litigation
reiterated the same principle later in the decision: "To summarize the preceding discussion,
we have concluded that we possess the power to enter an order against defendants under Rule
37(a) compelling them to produce documents located abroad if the particular defendant is
within the personal jurisdiction of this court and has control over the requested documents."
480 F. Supp. at 1148.
"Id at 1148. Defendants in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation had asserted that the court
should assess, under Section 40(a) of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the
United Slates, the competing economic and social policies of the United States and the foreign
nations involved. Id The court declined to apply the "national interests" tests under Section
40(a) of the Restatement. As will be described later in this article, the tests under Section 40(a)
of the Restatement have received more attention by other courts, but have not significantly
varied the results.
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explicitly refused to engage in the balancing tests urged by the parties
invoking the foreign nondisclosure statutes: 33
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even author-
ity, to evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign country, such a bal-
ancing test is inherently unworkable in this case. The competing interests here
display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy.
Westinghouse seeks to enforce this nation's antitrust laws against an alleged
international marketing arrangement among uranium producers, and to that end
has sought documents located in foreign countries where those producers conduct
their business. In specific response to this and other related litigation in the
American courts three foreign governments have enacted nondisclosure legisla-
tion which is aimed at nullifying the impact of American antitrust legislation by
prohibiting access to those same documents. It is simply impossible to judicially
"balance" these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions.
Similarly, the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver34 emphasizes the tendency of recent
decisions to turn aside claims of exemption under foreign blocking legisla-
tion, even when the foreign legislation purports to impose criminal sanc-
tions. In Arthur Andersen, the district court overruled objections to
disclosure based on provisions of foreign law which contained criminal
sanctions. The party against which the disclosure order was granted then
sought review of the district court's order in the Tenth Circuit. Affirming.
the lower court's determination, the Tenth Circuit in Arthur Andersen said:
An anomalous situation with great potential effect would result from recognition
of the right of a litigant to avoid discovery permitted by local law through the
assertion of violation of foreign law. Foreign law may not control local law. It
cannot invalidate an order which local law authorizes. [Emphasis supplied.] 35
One of the most recent (and widely publicized) decisions overruling for-
eign blocking legislation was rendered by Judge Pollack of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana.36 The decision draws on the
decisions in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, Finesilver and other cases,
and represents still another precedent in the line of cases which has
declined to defer to foreign legislation to displace disclosure in accordance
with the routine U.S. mechanisms.
In Banca Della Svizzera, a civil action brought by the SEC seeking an
injunction and an accounting for violations of the insider trading provisions
of the federal securities laws, the Commission moved for an order pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 37 compelling disclosure because of
the refusal of defendant Banca Della Svizzera to provide the Commission
with information relative to the identities of the principals for whom it
purchased stock and stock options on American securities exchanges. The
331d at 1148.
-'546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
11546 F.2d at 341-342.
3692 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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defendant, whose principal offices were located in Switzerland, had failed
to make any disclosure whatsoever on the ground that under Swiss law its
engaging in pretrial discovery in the American litigation would subject it
"to criminal liability in its home country. '37
In reaching his decision to order full disclosure consistent with American
procedural rules, Judge Pollack noted that the SEC had engaged in various,
less formal efforts to secure disclosure from the foreign defendant. In this
connection, Judge Pollack noted that the SEC had endeavored by "one or
another procedural means, here and abroad," to obtain the identities of
those who were involved in the particular securities purchases at issue in the
litigation. According to Judge Pollack, notwithstanding the SEC's efforts to
accommodate the demands of the foreign party, "no disclosure was
forthcoming. '38
The foreign defendant in Banca Della Svizzera engaged in a pattern of
conduct typical of defendants invoking foreign law; these efforts have
included suggestions that disclosure-in forms other than answers to inter-
rogatories and production of documents-will be made available. When
confronted with the same proposals, which were advanced by the nondis-
closing party in Banca Della Svizzera purportedly as a means of accommo-
dation, Judge Pollack ultimately concluded that the suggestions made by
the bank as to the appropriate means of pursuing disclosure from it "were
doomed to failure."' 39 Judge Pollack further said:
It appeared to the Court that the proposals would only send the SEC on empty
excursions, with little to show for them except more delay, more expense, more
frustration, and possibly also, the inexorable operation of time bars against the
claims by statutory limits for the assertion thereof. Theproposed alternatives were
not viable substitutes for direct discovery.40
Judge Pollack concluded his decision in words which may be applicable
to virtually any foreign corporate defendant involved in American litiga-
tion which has engaged in substantial business in the United States:
It would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American
markets, violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits
and resist accountability for itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming




"'Id [Emphasis supplied.] The decision in Banca Della Svizzera, rendered on November 16,
1981, has led to discussions between representatives of the Swiss and U.S. governments
designed to prevent further use of Swiss bank secrecy laws to conceal illegal insider trading on
U.S. securities markets. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1982, at 44, col. 6.
4'Id at 119. Other disclosure orders in litigation involving foreign blocking statutes have
been entered in United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63, 639 (D.N.M. 1980); United States v. Ciba Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74, 026 (D.N.J. 1972);
In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Prod., Transp., Ref. & Dist. of
Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1952); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v.
Field), 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1978).
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2. Certain of the Emerging Defenses to Orders of Production
As the decisions in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation and Banca Della
Svizzera suggest, a foreign defendant's bare assertion that it might face
exposure to criminal sanctions if it were to comply with a traditional U.S.
discovery demand will rarely persuade a court.42 Since the invocation of
the possibility of criminal liability, without more, has proven generally inef-
fective as a means of sustaining the foreign law claim, certain more sophis-
ticated lines of defense have evolved. One of the initial lines of defense on
any motion seeking to compel disclosure will include reliance on certain
precedents, rendered primarily in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which refused to grant orders compelling disclosure when a claim
of foreign illegality was raised. For reasons explained below, reliance on
these older precedents, decided between 1958 and 1966, has become
increasingly unpersuasive, in part because of the Second Circuit's own
abandonment of its earlier position.
Another emerging line of defense will arise with respect to litigation in
which the foreign country whose blocking statute is invoked is, like France,
also a signatory to the Hague Convention. The other central emerging
defense is grounded on Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1965).
(A) EARLY SECOND CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS: DEFERRAL TO FOREIGN LAW
The judicial reaction to the more recent foreign blocking statutes-such
as the Canadian, Australian and South African laws at issue in In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation-is considerably more disclosure-oriented than
the treatment reflected in a line of earlier cases, decided particularly in the
Second Circuit, in which a conflict arose between American discovery rules
and foreign nondisclosure statutes.43
In In re Chase Manhattan Bank," the Second Circuit, without extensive
discussion of the reasons underlying its decision, refused enforcement of an
Internal Revenue Service subpoena for documents held by a New York
bank at one of its branches in Panama. The bank had presented an opinion
of its Panamanian counsel that production of the documents "would violate
Panamanian law," which purportedly prohibited removal of the documents
from that nation. '45
Relying solely on the opinion of Panamanian counsel to the nondisclos-
ing bank, the Second Circuit refused to compel production pursuant to the
subpoena, asserting that enforcement would "scarcely reflect the kind of
4
"See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Possible crimi-
nal liability in Switzerland does not preclude enforcement and sanctions.")
41As one commentator has noted, the earlier decisions were "characterized by an almost
automatic deference to such nondisclosure laws." Note, Foreign Nondisclosure and Antitrust
Discovery, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 615 (1979).
"297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
41297 F.2d at 612.
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respect which we should accord to the laws of a friendly foreign sovereign
state."
46
Similar deference to foreign nondisclosure law was displayed by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Ings v. Ferguson.4 7 In Ings, a party to an American lawsuit
subpoenaed certain nonparty banks to produce documents located in
Canada.4 8 The banks resisting disclosure submitted conflicting legal affida-
vits, prepared by Canadian counsel, as to whether Canadian law prohibited
disclosure of the requested documents.
The Second Circuit in Ings declined to "interpret" Canadian law to
determine which theory was correct. 49 Instead, the court passed the entire
issue of disclosure to the Canadian judicial system, ruling that, "under fun-
damental principles of international comity, our courts. . . should not take
such action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor, or,
at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures. Whether
removal of records from Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian
law and is best resolved by Canadian courts.50
The Second Circuit ultimately retreated from its deference to foreign
nondisclosure laws. In United States P. First National City Bank,5 ' the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the ruling of a federal district court that a foreign non-
disclosure statute did not excuse compliance with a subpoena duces tecum
issued in connection with a grand jury investigation. The Second Circuit in
First National City Bank emphasized that the risk of foreign criminal liabil-
ity did not resolve the issue of disclosure, noting that a "state having juris-
diction to prescribe or enforce a rule of law is not precluded from exercising
its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in
conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having
jurisdiction with respect to that conduct. '52
In rejecting the claims of the nondisclosing party, which had invoked the
threat of criminal and civil liability if a disclosure order were entered, the
Second Circuit in First National City Bank said that the party seeking a
shield under foreign law "must confront the choice" of the "need to 'surren-
der to one sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom' or, alter-
natively, a willingness to accept the consequerces. ' '53
The earlier line of Second Circuit cases will continue to provide prece-
dent for nondisclosing parties, notwithstanding the fact that, as Judge Pol-
lack has recently noted, the "Second Circuit has clearly moved to a more
"Id at 613.
'7282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
48Id at 150.
49Id at 151.
5 1d at 152.
"1396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
52396 F.2d at 901.
"Id at 905; (quoting First National City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Service,
271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959) [analyzing and rejecting City Bank's contention that enforce-
ment of a federal court order would require a violation of the law of Panama], cert. denied, 361
U.S. 948 (1960)).
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flexible position."'54 The earlier Second Circuit precedents are routinely
cited in support of the nondisclosing party's position in recent cases, but
have not, for the most part, successfully sustained claims of nondisclosure.
Indeed, several other circuits have rejected the application of the earlier
cases. 55 In short, the American litigant seeking disclosure is in a position to
discredit the conflicting precedents established by the earlier Second Circuit
cases, in which, for a period of almost a decade, deference to foreign law
was a talisman for nondisclosure.
(B) THE ROLE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Because the French blocking statute, read literally, appears to permit evi-
dence-gathering in accordance with the terms of the Hague Convention, a
nondisclosing party served with a traditional discovery request may assert
that disclosure is available simply by the use of the Hague Convention. A
French party consequently can argue that it is willing to provide informa-
tion within the framework of the Hague Convention but that it should be
relieved of complying with routine U.S. disclosure devices because of possi-
ble exposure to French criminal sanctions.
The American litigant seeking disclosure through interrogatories and
document production must meet this possible defense by illustrating, as
previously described in this article, that the French version of the Hague
Convention is clearly and specifically calculated to preclude the use of its
mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining pretrial disclosure, as that term is
routinely applied in U.S. practice. An explanation to the American court of
the relationship between the blocking statute and the Hague Convention
might be useful in persuading the court that the nondisclosing party's strat-
egy of citing the Hague Convention is merely a means of continuing to
refuse to provide meaningful disclosure.
A nondisclosing party may also interpose an argument that the Hague
Convention, as a treaty of the United States, provides the mandatory mech-
anism for obtaining evidence from a foreign party. A corrollary of this
argument-particularly where litigation in state courts is involved-is that
the Hague Convention must be used because the treaty represents the
supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause of Section 2 of Arti-
cle VI of the U.S. Constitution. Authority for such a position can be found
in a decision of an intermediate appellate court in the state of California.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, Alameda County,56 in fact
required an American litigant to make prior resort to the procedures under
the Hague Convention in seeking disclosure from a West German corpora-
tion which had appeared in the state court action. However, the Volkswa-
genwerk court was careful to disclaim that its decision in that case to
5
'Banca Della Svizzera, supra, 92 F.R.D. at 115.
"See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981); State of Ohio v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
163 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1st Dist. 1981).
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require resort in initially to the terms of the Hague Convention was a mat-
ter of constitutional mandate. As the California court said in
Volkswagenwerk:
We could perhaps read the Hague Convention, broadly, as a preemptive and
exclusive rule of international evidence-gathering, binding upon us as the
supreme law of the land under Section 2 of Article VI of the Federal Constitu-
tion, but we Prefer to believe that the Hague Convention establishes not a fixed
rule . . ..
In meeting an adversary's argument that initial resort must be made to
the procedures of the Hague Convention, an American litigant can also
point to the fact that nothing in the terms of the treaty itself explicitly
requires the use of letters of request or commissions-the two principal
vehicles of evidence-gathering under the treaty-in lieu of answers to inter-
rogatories and production of documents. Significantly, not a single provi-
sion of the Hague Convention mandates its use in the context of discovery
sought from a party which has appeared in an action pending in the United
States, and which may have, in addition, affirmatively invoked the jurisdic-
tion of the American court through the pleading of counterclaims and itself
sought disclosure. In addition, Article 27 of the Hague Convention speci-
fies that the treaty is neither mandatory nor exclusive, providing, in perti-
nent part:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a contracting state
from ... (c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence
other than those provided for in this Convention.
The treaty thus appears to make plain that it is not intended to displace
traditional discovery procedures when disclosure is sought from a party to
an American litigation.
Moreover, in withstanding claims of the nondisclosing party that the
Hague Convention provides the exclusive mechanism for disclosure from a
foreign entity, the American litigant can demonstrate that the legislative
history-albeit not extensive-accompanying the adoption of the Hague
Convention by the United States tends to negate any inference that the
treaty was intended, by either the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment or the Senate in giving its advice and consent, to provide an exclusive
mandatory mechanism for discovery of foreign parties involved in Ameri-
can litigation. Instead, the available legislative history indicates that the
treaty is designed to facilitate access to foreign information in cases where
su .h information was ordinarily not available by subpoena or traditional
process. 58
" 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The court in Volkswagenwerk was careful to limit its decision to the
facts of that particular case (id), and to characterize its preference for initial use of the Hague
Convention procedures as discretionary. Also of significance is the fact that West Germany
has not executed an Article 23 reservation to the Hague Convention-which would have had
the effect of eliminating the use of letters of request to obtain pre-trial disclosure-nor has it
adopted legislation similar to the French blocking statute.
"The legislative history of the Convention, which appears at 12 I.L.M. 323 (1972), is embod-
ied primarily in a letter of transmittal dated February 1, 1981 from President Nixon to the U.S.
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(C) THE ROLE OF SECTION 40 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
A common strategy of a nondisclosing foreign party attempting to justify
its position is the invocation of Section 40 of the Restatement Second of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965), which provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in the light of such factors as (a) vital
national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hard-
ship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the
extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state, (d) the nationality of the person, and (e) the extent which enforcement by
action of either state could reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the
rule prescribed by that state.
The nondisclosing defendant will routinely invoke the provisions of Sec-
tion 40 of the Restatement to argue that disclosure should not be ordered
since the foreign party will violate the law of its country. These claims are
likely to be accompanied by the foreign party's raising the specter of crimi-
nal sanctions. The response of the American litigant seeking full traditional
disclosure has been to concede that the foreign governments involved
undoubtedly have a strong commercial interest in protecting their domestic
corporations from the expense and hazards of defending American litiga-
tion.5 9 That interest, however, cannot justify their attempt to conceal the
facts as to activity by private corporations from courts of competent juris-
diction in the United States. The means these governments have employed
to seek to protect their commercial interests-threatening to punish those
who give evidence-run counter to the basic premise of the judicial system
in the United States. It is in this context that the "national interest" compo-
nent of the Section 40 test is most sharply framed.
A substantial amount of the litigation in which disputes over conceal-
ment legislation have developed involves the federal antitrust laws. In this
Senate which sought the Senate's advice and consent for the ratification of the treaty. Accom-
panying the President's letter of transmittal to the Senate was a letter of submittal dated
November 9, 1971 to the President from then Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Secretary
Rogers, in his letter of submittal to the President, makes it clear that the Convention was not
presented to the Senate for its advice and consent as a substitute for traditional pre-trial dis-
covery. According to Secretary Rogers, the Convention was intended to fill the gap in siua-
tions where litigants in American actions sought to obtain evidence in foreign countries from
persons not subject to the court's jurisdiction, thus necessitating cooperation of a foreign court
to compel the giving of evidence. The letter of submittal specifically states that the Convention
was intended as a "model" of a system "to bridge differences between the common law and
civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad." President Nixon, in his letter to the
Senate, described the Hague Convention as a "significant step forward in the field of interna-
tional judicial cooperation" but not an exclusive means of obtaining evidence.
"
9See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
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context, American litigants have argued that the case law demonstrates that
the United States has a strong national interest in enforcement of its anti-
trust laws, which "have long been considered among the cornerstones of
this nation's economic policies."' 60 Antitrust is clearly "an interest such as
national security or general welfare to which a state attaches overriding
importance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
supra Section 40, Comment b.
Particularly in the case of antitrust disputes, the American litigant seek-
ing disclosure has tended to assert that it does not appear in the action as a
mere private litigant but, instead, as a private attorney general seeking to
enforce laws of high public importance. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed the belief of Congress "that private antitrust litigation is one of the
surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."'6 1
For purposes of the Section 40 test, the high water-mark of the primacy
of the United States "national interest" in its antitrust laws may have
passed, as a result of certain recent decisions involving the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,62 and Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp. ,63 the courts began a
process which has resulted in the retrenchment of the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. antitrust statutes. The decisions, in lessening the emphasis on the
central importance of enforcement of U.S. antitrust law by private litigants,
have attempted to formulate a "rule of reason" approach to determine
when, and under what circumstances, substantive Amerioan antitrust law
should apply to foreign parties and extraterritorial conduct.
Notwithstanding the recent retrenchment reflected in Timberlane and
Mannington Mills, the American litigant contesting a blocking statute still
can rely on the "national interests" factor of the Restatement when antitrust
litigation is at issue; that reliance, however, may not carry the burden it has
in the past. In addition, the "national interest" component of the Section 40
test has vitality in areas other than antitrust. In Banca Della Svizzera, for
example, Judge Pollack assessed the interest of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in enforcing the federal securities laws, declaring that "the
strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to
insure the integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted.
64
'
0United States v. First National City Bank, supra, 396 F.2d at 903. See also United States
v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Northern Pacific Railway v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
"Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965).
62549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
63595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
"92 F.R.D. at 117. It merits emphasis that certain decisions, such as In re Uranium Anti-
trust Litigation, supra, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. IU. 1979), have declined to engage in any
balancing tests under Section 40 of the Restatement. As the court declared in In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, "the decision whether to exercise that power [to override a foreign nondis-
closure statute] is a discretionary one which is informed by three main factors: (1) the impor-
tance of the policies underlying the United States statute which forms the basis for the
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As far as the "hardship" issue is concerned under Section 40, the litigant
seeking enforcement may also note that the countries in question, such as
France, have enacted concealment laws in order to protect their nationals,
not to punish them. If it becomes apparent that the concealment scheme
will not be effective to protect the foreign corporation, those countries may
well elect not to punish those whom they have sought to protect. 65
An even more compelling rebuttal of a defense predicated on Section 40
of the Restatement will apply in a situation where the nondisclosing
defendant itself bears responsibility for the enactment of the concealment
legislation. Particularly in the case of those companies which invoked the
uranium concealment legislation, the American litigant seeking disclosure
will probably be able to show that the foreign defendant itself courted the
impediment to disclosure.
E..The Issue of Sanctions
The securing of an order compelling disclosure may not mark the end of
the struggle. A significant number of cases in which orders of disclosure
have been entered have had subsequent histories, engendered by the.contin-
ued refusal of the foreign party to answer interrogatories or otherwise pro-
vide disclosure. While recent U.S. decisions have evidenced a judicial
tendency to order disclosure and override claims under foreign blocking
statutes, the courts' approach to the imposition of sanctions for continued
failure to disclose has been significantly more fragmented. As a result, for-
eign parties which have lost the initial battle may enjoy a substantial likeli-
hood of successfully continuing to withhold disclosure without suffering the
consequence of material sanctions.
U.S. courts have broad discretion with regard to the imposition of sanc-
tions, depending upon the reasons asserted for failure to comply with dis-
covery orders, the plaintifis need for the requested information, and the
express purpose of the broad discovery mandated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-to enable the trier of fact to make an informed, fair and
just determination of the issues in the litigation. Indeed, due process may
well require the court to fashion appropriate sanctions if a defendant per-
plaintif's claims; (2) the importance of the requested documents in illuminating key elements
of the claims; and (3) the degree of flexibility in the foreign nation's application of its non-
disclosure laws." 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
6 The hardship component of the Section 40 test has involved primarily questions of poten-
tial criminal and financial exposure of the party resisting disclosure. The reported decisions
have tended to minimize such claims of exposure to liability. Moreover, the reported decisions
have not addressed arguments, in support of nondisclosure, based on concepts such as foreign
government compulsion or common law duress. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizerra,
supra, 92 F.R.D. Ill (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 410 (5th
Cir. 1976) ("We regret that our decision requires Mr. Field to violate the legal commands of
the Cayman Islands, his country of residence"); United States v. First National City Bank, 396
F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1969); Inter-American Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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sists in its failure to produce documents that are essential for a plaintiff to
prove its case and refute the affirmative defenses.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and most analogous provi-
sions of state law, there are a number of sanctions which the court may
ultimately consider, including: 1. default judgment; 2. striking affirmative
defenses; 3. making specific adverse findings of fact regarding illegal meet-
ings, agreements and concerted action which a plaintiff can show by
independent evidence; 4. instructing the jury it can draw inferences from
the failure of defendants to produce documents or testify; 5. admitting into
evidence documents regarding the illegal acts of defendants that were
obtained from other sources; and 6. precluding defendants from offering
evidence or explanations with respect to certain issues.
Most decisions require some showing of "willfulness" to support impos-
ing the extreme sanctions of default judgment or dismissal of actions. 66 The
Supreme Court decision in Societe Internationale v. Rogers,6 7 establishes
the framework in which the issue of sanctions relating to foreign blocking
statutes is generally considered.
Societe Internationale involved a claim under the Trading with the
Enemy Act for recovery of assets seized by the United States during World
War II. When the plaintiff failed to comply with a pretrial order directing
production of certain Swiss banking records, the district court dismissed the
action. The plaintiff objected that disclosure of the records would violate
Swiss law, and indeed Swiss authorities had "confiscated" the records by
specifically barring their transmission to third parties. A special master had
found that the plaintiff had made good faith efforts to comply with the dis-
covery request and that there was no evidence of collusion between the
plaintiff and the Swiss authorities in barring production.68
Although upholding the district court's authority to direct production of
the documents, the Supreme Court reversed its dismissal of the action for
failure to comply with the order. The Court first rejected the plaintiff's con-
tention that it was not in conirol of the records, noting that the plaintiff had
physical control over the records; that production of the records was impor-
tant to fulfill the congressional policies underlying the Trading with the
Enemy Act; and that the plaintiff "is in a most advantageous position to
plead with its own sovereign for relaxation of penal laws or for adoption of
plans which will at the least achieve a significant measure of compliance
with the production order .... ,,69
In explaining its decision to order disclosure but not to sanction the fail-
ure to comply with dismissal (generally regarded as the most extreme sanc-
"Ag., Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1974); Dorsey v. Academy Moving &
Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1970); General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481
F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1973) Sapiro v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 452 F.2d 215, 216-17 (7th
Cir. 1971).
"357 U.S. 197 (1958).
6357 U.S. at 201.
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tion), the Court emphasized the overriding constitutional due process
limitations on the authority of courts to dismiss actions without affording
hearings on the merits. The Court suggested that serious constitutional
questions would be posed by a dismissal for failure to comply with a court
order where that failure was due to the party's inability to comply, despite
good faith efforts to do so.70
As a result, the Court held that dismissal for failure to comply with a
discovery order was not warranted "when it has been established that fail-
ure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or
any fault of [the party]." 7' Stressing a case-by-case approach to the issue of
sanctions, the Court said that, even if a foreign party made a specific show-
ing of its good faith in seeking to comply with a discovery order, it should
not be permitted to "profit through its inability to tender the records called
for.72 The case was remanded for further proceedings in the district court's
"wide discretion," which could include "drawing inferences unfavorable to
defendant as to particular events."'73 Significantly, the Court left no doubt
that if the facts showed that the defendant had "deliberately courted legal
impediments to discovery, then the most severe sanctions would be
appropriate. '74
Most of the subsequent cases have treated foreign blocking statutes as
relevant only to a decision whether to impose sanctions for failure to pro-
duce evidence, rather than as bearing on the decision whether to order pro-
duction in the first instance.75 In addition, most courts have excused
nonproduction only upon a showing of both a direct conflict with a foreign
law imposing criminal penalties and a good faith effort to obtain a waiver.76
Even absent a showing of bad faith on the part of a foreign defendant,
U.S. courts have the power to make evidentiary rulings designed to secure
compliance with its discovery orders or to remedy the prejudice arising
from nondisclosure of relevant evidence. Besides the "willfulness" of
defendants, the significance of the evidence being withheld, the commercial
motives underlying the foreign laws, and the need to present an accurate
picture to the jury would support the imposition of alternative sanctions. A







7"See, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976).
"Compare In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992
(10th Cir. 1977), and FMC v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (nonproduction
excused on showing of conflict with foreign law and good faith attempt to obtain waiver) with
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1975),
and United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63, 639 (N.M.
1980) (failure to produce not excused and sanctions imposed).
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issues as to which there is a failure of discovery. 77
F. Conclusion
Foreign concealment and blocking legislation is becoming an increas-
ingly significant aspect of current civil litigation in which nonresident
defendants are involved. When devising its litigation strategy, an American
party pursuing a claim against a foreign defendant must give consideration
to the possibility that the ability to prosecute the litigation may well be
hampered--or the costs of litigation significantly increased-by the asser-
tion of foreign concealment legislation.
In the event the litigation decision is reached that disclosure from a for-
eign party is essential to the effective prosecution of the claim, the Ameri-
can party should give serious consideration to mounting a frontal attack on
the foreign blocking statute and the right of the foreign party to invoke it.
As this article has demonstrated, the U.S. litigant should consider includ-
ing in its motion papers a description of the foreign statute, as well as a
description of its legislative history, in order to frame for the court the con-
flict between U.S. disclosure rules and the antagonism toward those rules
evidenced by virtually all foreign blocking statutes. The American court is
then in a position to assess the interests to be served by traditional Ameri-
can disclosure devices, on the one hand, and by the application of the for-
eign blocking statute, on the other hand. Assuming that the American
litigant can display the relevance of the information sought, the prevailing
tendency of the American courts, at least at the stage of considering
whether to issue an order of disclosure, is to override the foreign blocking
statute in the interest of providing an American litigant information rele-
vant to the prosecution of its claim.
"Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Such orders have been entered where the refusal to make
discovery was justified. Eg., Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (Fifth Amendment privilege); Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co. v. Strauss
& Co., 38 F. Supp. 229 (D. Ore. 1940) (documents lost "due to some mishap").

